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The opportunity to provide a Canadian policy analyst's perspective  at this conference
is a rare privilege as the agricultural economics  community does not usually  get together to
discuss the art and practice of autarchy except  in purely theoretical circumstances.  In fact,
there  is a powerful argument to be made that, for this industry, the agricultural  economists
on  both  sides  of the border have  mainly been  engaged  for the  last  generation  or two  in
making  sure that there was no Canada-U.S.  dairy trade.  The art and practice  of autarchy has
been very successful, because the Uruguay Round notwithstanding, there  is hardly any trade
in milk or dairy products  and there has not been much as far back as the  1930s.  This is no
accident-it is the result of concerted  government action and industry desire in both Canada
and the United States.
For example,  Section 22 of the U.S. Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933  was added
in 1935  and was reinvented  many times thereafter.  Canada, on the other hand, operated a
differential tariff scheme before the Second World War which applied lower tariffs to British
Commonwealth  supplies but was also a substantial exporter of dairy products.
Most of the U.S.  Section  22 quota and import quantity  limits that were tariffied in
1995  date from the 1950s and  1960s.  By 1970, the United States had quotas in place which
were  consistent  with  the  U.S.  1955  GATT  (temporary)  waiver  and  which  limited  the
quantities of  imports of  almost all dairy products.  The exceptions were fluid milk, casein and
soft-ripened cheeses such as camembert and brie.
Canada  proceeded  more  cautiously.  Cheddar  cheese was  first  put under import
control  in 1957.  In 1969, the Export and Import  Permits Act was amended to allow more
dairy products to be subject to import controls consistent with Article XI 2(c) of the GATT.
During the  1970s and  1980s, additions were made which brought Canada's import barriers
close to the level of coverage which the United States had under Section 22 quotas.
It  remains  true  today  that dairy  trade  between  Canada  and the  United  States  is
extremely  small.  In aggregate, both countries import only about two percent of their dairy
market requirements  and almost all of that comes from third countries.  Recently the largest
seller  of U.S.  dairy  products  to  Canada was  most  likely  a  gas  station  in  Point Roberts,
Washington where British Columbia consumers  buy low priced gasoline and milk.Proceedings
This history makes the point that dairy policies and programs  in both countries have
been developed in isolation for the last sixty years.  Of course this phenomenon of isolation
in domestic policy development is not unique to North America.  Governments  have been
very sensitive to dairy sectors.  It has been observed that Canada's  first dairy policy involved
providing a new settler with an axe, a cow and a spouse,  in that order of importance.  Milk
markets  have  been  held  in  isolation  from  world  markets  in  most  northern  hemisphere
developed countries.  The European Community  is one example of this process and also a
model which other nations have felt bound to copy.
Of course the  case of Canada-U.S.  dairy trade  is an agricultural economist's dream.
Two countries with a three thousand plus mile common border succeed  in keeping it closed
for sixty years or more.  They have put in place dairy programs intended to achieve domestic
objectives  based on the  certainty that market penetration by imports will be fixed and very
limited.  There has been no need to have regard to Canada-U.S. dairy trade because there is
none to speak of, by design,  on both sides of our border.
The mythological  analogy  for this that comes to  mind is Romulus and  Remus, the
founders of Rome;  they are alleged to have been  suckled and raised by a she-wolf,  thereby
providing a very early  case study  for students wishing to  find out which human behaviour
is innate  and which  is learned!  The dairy policies  and programs of our two countries have
also grown up in isolation.  Do not be surprised therefore  that they are different,  and do not
underestimate  how different  they really  are!  It is  not just the high profile  programs  and
border controls that are different;  differences  are far deeper than that.
It should be noted that the Uruguay Round outcome made virtually no change to trade.
The U.S.  final offer on dairy access  fell short of the 3 rising to 5 percent Dunkel guideline;
Canada mirrored the U.S. offer  in aggregate when formulating its own offer.  In practice, the
increased  access  in both cases has  gone mainly to third countries.  Even by the end of the
Uruguay  Round transition period in the year 2000, each country will have minimal access
to  the  other's  market  under  tariff rate  quotas.  Both  countries  will  continue  to  have
multilateral  over-quota tariffs  in place based on their Uruguay  Round schedules which will
still  be prohibitive to trade.
The Crawford-Stillman paper  has mentioned the high level of Canadian dairy product
tariffs but U.S. dairy  import tariffs  will be equally effective  in preventing Canadian  dairy
exports to the United States,  even in year 2000.
Policy makers in both countries have, for many years,  had the luxury of establishing
their domestic dairy policies without having to consider trade aspects to any extent.  Surplus
removal  policies which back-stop domestic  markets are  in place at the Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) in the United  States and at the Canadian Dairy  Commission (CDC)  in
Canada.  These programs underpin  the industrial dairy  products markets and indirectly the
market price for industrial milk in each country.  Programs  such as federal  and  state milk
orders in the states and provincial  fluid milk regimes in Canada  support regional fluid milk
pricing  at  levels  which  are  administered  and  exceed  industrial  milk  prices.  These
government commodity-specific  programs  are similar in design and objectives.  However
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a very important difference  in approach  has been the use of pricing in the United States to
limit  supply.  Canada,  on  the  other  hand,  has  used  production  quotas  to  limit supply.
Economists who are not working regularly with agricultural systems that include production
constraints sometimes forget that the observed price is not necessarily  on the supply curve,
i.e.,  prices  could  probably  be  significantly  lower  before  a  supply  response  would  be
observed  in economic  terms,  the administered  supply curve is vertical  through a  wide
range of prices,  above and below the current, administered prices.
The Canadian and U.S.  markets  are isolated from each other not only by  tariffs on
imports but also by a battery of technical,  sanitary and phytosanitary barriers.  For anyone
who is not familiar with the history of Canadian U.H.T. milk exports to Puerto Rico, there
are still plenty of non-tariff barriers in play.  Those exports have just resumed after a hiatus
of several years following Puerto Rico's adoption of the Pasteurized Milk Order.  Our exports
were halted while the conformity of the Canadian product with the U.S.  Pasteurized Milk
Order was verified.  That process took several years.
As  the trade  situation  changes,  governments  are  going to  need help  from  policy
analysts.  This will have to include practical advice on how policies and programs can change
incrementally towards a more liberal trade scenario in both directions across the Canada-U.S.
Border.  Supply-managed systems are a real challenge to modellers, so step one is, as always,
to have a firm understanding of what is in place and why.
With regard to the NAFTA Chapter 20 Panel, this Panel  is currently dealing with a
U.S. complaint  about Canadian tariffication as negotiated in the Uruguay Round, included
in Canada's schedules  in Marrakesh in April 1994,  and implemented in 1995  for imports of
dairy products  into Canada.  The  U.S. position  is that these  tariff equivalents should not
apply to products originating in the U.S.  The United States cites Articles 302(1) and 302(2)
of  the  NAFTA  as  the  basis  of their  position.  These  Articles  require  countries  to
progressively  eliminate and not to increase custom duties except as otherwise  provided for
elsewhere in the NAFTA.
Canada has now replied  in detail to the U.S. case.  Given that the Panel deliberations
are in progress,  Canada's case must not be promoted in detail except to say that it explains
that trade in agricultural  goods was provided  for in Chapter 7 of the NAFTA and that those
provisions take precedence  over the General Provisions  in Chapter 3.  Chapter 7 allows for
the tariffication  of agricultural non-tariff barriers as negotiated multilaterally in the Uruguay
Round.
An interesting aspect of the  U.S. position is that, if true, it would also apply in reverse
and is not specific to dairy, i.e., if the United States were correct, tariffication of U.S. Section
22  regimes  for  dairy  and some other  sectors,  such  as sugar  and peanuts,  would also  be
inconsistent with the NAFTA.  This might  come as  a rather unwelcome  surprise  in some
quarters.
Trade access for dairy products has more support now in the United States than at any
time  in the  last sixty years.  How broadly based  that  support is  and how  far  it embraces
liberalization  of U.S. border measures as well as those of potential importers of U.S. dairy
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products  is  not entirely  clear.  However,  recent  U.S.  dairy  and  exporting  activities  both
through the Dairy  Export Incentive  Program (DEIP) and  through unsubsidized  exports at
world market competitive prices have clearly brought about a change  in attitudes  within the
U.S.  dairy industry.  Analyses  showing  Canada as  a large  potential market  for U.S. dairy
exports  may have played  a part.  "Access"  may  be a more  important  variable  in driving
opinion than "free trade"  in dairy products.
In Canada,  the  dairy industry  made a conscious  decision  in the  1960s to withdraw
largely from export markets that Canada had been supplying.  The dairy industry  remains
to be convinced that dairy exports on a larger scale than at present can contribute to adequate
and reasonably stable revenues  for the  sector in the future.  Similar attitudes probably exist
in the United States too,  judging  from dairy industry  responses to Congress' recent efforts
at  dairy  program  reform.  Better  the  domestic  market  you  know  than  the  peril  and
uncertainties  of international trade seems to be the underlying principle.
North American dairy trade liberalization  is probably coming.  Probably not soon and
probably  not  fast,  but  the  pressure  for  change  is  there.  In  Jakarta,  Miami,  Kyoto,  and
elsewhere,  the directions seem to be quite clear.  It is driven by  export interests  in the short
term but in the  medium term,  it is driven by pressures to do  multilaterally  for agricultural
trade what has already been achieved  for industrial goods.  The World Trade Organization
is likely the main vehicle for this but there may be other vehicles too.
The implications  of this for dairy trade and policy analysts  is that there likely is an
emerging  market for our services which will continue  for several years.  Decision-makers  in
government and in the private sector are going to need our help to navigate a  complex policy
environment in which barriers to trade  are first reduced and perhaps eventually eliminated.
CONCLUSION
A vital  first step is to get our facts right.  This seminar is an important  step in that
process.  Both the United States and Canadian dairy programs are complex;  we have seen
examples in the past of analysis based on misconceptions of how the Canadian system works.
I know that the mysteries of exactly how your marketing order system works have, at least
until now,  been unravelled by only a handful of cognoscenti; Canadian supply management
in dairy may be a similar case.
If the transition towards  freer dairy trade between our two countries will be gradual,
then the method by which the transition  is handled  becomes critical.  This transition  is not
only with respect to trade policies, but also with respect to the domestic policies each country
can pursue.  How do you best analyse that?  Going to the  end point and working backwards
will not do.  It appears that transitional arrangements will shape the eventual  outcome.
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